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Cognitive neuroscience boils down to describing the ways in which cognitive function
results from brain activity. In turn, brain activity shows complex fluctuations, with structure
at many spatio-temporal scales. Exactly how cognitive function inherits the physical
dimensions of neural activity, though, is highly non-trivial, and so are generally the
corresponding dimensions of cognitive phenomena. As for any physical phenomenon,
when studying cognitive function, the first conceptual step should be that of establishing
its dimensions. Here, we provide a systematic presentation of the temporal aspects
of task-related brain activity, from the smallest scale of the brain imaging technique’s
resolution, to the observation time of a given experiment, through the characteristic time
scales of the process under study. We first review some standard assumptions on the
temporal scales of cognitive function. In spite of their general use, these assumptions hold
true to a high degree of approximation for many cognitive (viz. fast perceptual) processes,
but have their limitations for other ones (e.g., thinking or reasoning). We define in a
rigorous way the temporal quantifiers of cognition at all scales, and illustrate how they
qualitatively vary as a function of the properties of the cognitive process under study. We
propose that each phenomenon should be approached with its own set of theoretical,
methodological and analytical tools. In particular, we show that when treating cognitive
processes such as thinking or reasoning, complex properties of ongoing brain activity,
which can be drastically simplified when considering fast (e.g., perceptual) processes,
start playing a major role, and not only characterize the temporal properties of task-related
brain activity, but also determine the conditions for proper observation of the phenomena.
Finally, some implications on the design of experiments, data analyses, and the choice of
recording parameters are discussed.
Keywords: cognitive neuroscience, characteristic time, relaxation time, observation time, non-Gaussianity, scaling,
fluctuation-dissipation theorem, non-self-averaging
INTRODUCTION
What’s the temporal dimension of cognition? Hardly ever is this
question addressed by cognitive neuroscientists, possibly because
it appears as either trivial or meaningless.
Cognitive psychologists have long recognized that behavior
may often present changes over many time scales (Newell et al.,
2001). However, experimental neuroscientists generally make
more or less covert assumptions on the dimensions of the phe-
nomena they investigate, some of which become visible when
considering the structure of experiments devised to investigate
cognitive function. Experiments are typically divided into trials
of essentially equal duration. On one hand, duration is implic-
itly equated to the characteristic length of cognitive phenomena,
with the nested assumptions that such a characteristic length
does exist, that it is unique (and therefore stationary modulo
learning-related trends), and known a priori. On the other hand,
duration is equated to the sample mean duration, fluctuations
around which are supposed to average out for a sufficiently high
number of trials. This set of intertwined covert assumptions also
ensures that the phenomenon under investigation is appropriately
observed. Furthermore, since each trial is supposed to sample
the same aspects of a unique underlying state space, the mere
number of trials guarantees that the phenomenon is appropriately
observed.
These assumptions hold true to a high degree of approxi-
mation for many cognitive (viz. perceptual) processes, but have
their limitations for other ones, e.g., thinking or reasoning. For
instance, a neuroscientist studying face perception knows the
approximate duration of her phenomenon (which indeed has a
meaningful mean duration) can estimate the number of trials
needed to explore the expected cognitive and associated neural
range of the phenomenon, and yielding reasonable signal-to-
noise ratios. On the contrary, a neuroscientist studying subjects
attempting to solve a complicated mathematical problem can-
not know what sort of durations (nor, in general, what average
duration) experiments may yield, what task-related time scales,
or quasi-periodicities brain activity may express, and as a result,
whether the phenomenon is appropriately observed.
In spite of this unique set of challenging properties, studies
of this type of phenomena often apply the same experimental
designs, techniques of data analysis, and models of brain activ-
ity as those of processes with very different characteristics, e.g.,
perceptual processes. This, however, supposes some restrictive
assumptions, including smoothing response times, to achieve
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trials of even duration and extract time averages (which are dif-
ficult to interpret, given inherent non-stationarities), or using
very specific and constrained forms of reasoning (e.g., Goel et al.,
1997, 1998; Osherson et al., 1998; Parsons and Osherson, 2001;
Bonnefond and Van der Henst, 2009), or limiting the analysis to
a very short time window (<1 s), e.g., in the temporal vicinity of
an answer to a given problem (e.g., Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Mai
et al., 2004; Lang et al., 2006; Qiu et al., 2008; Pijnacker et al.,
2011).
That establishing the temporal scales of cognitive phenomena
is both meaningful and fundamental, though, should also become
manifest as soon as cognitive function is understood to originate
from brain activity, and is quantitatively characterized in terms of
the brain properties associated with the execution of given cog-
nitive tasks. Perhaps not so intuitively, in fact, once cognition is
measured in units of brain activity, the cognitive processes under
investigation are de facto treated as physical phenomena. This has
two main implications. Firstly, cognition is endowed with the
physical dimensions of the associated brain activity. Secondly, the
study of cognitive phenomena becomes subject to the same prin-
ciples and experimental constraints presiding the experimental
study of ordinary physical phenomena: dimensions need to be
evaluated, through observations of limited time resolution and
performed over a finite, often relatively brief, time.
In the following, we systematically review time scale-related
aspects of cognition ranging from the resolution of the neu-
roimaging technique, to observation time of experiments, and
including the characteristic times of the processes under inves-
tigation. We discuss some conceptual and experimental impli-
cations which should be taken into account when designing
experiments in cognitive neuroscience.
TEMPORAL RESOLUTION
Cortical activity helps psychologists refining the space used to
describe cognitive function, by adding not only spatial dimen-
sions, but also a much finer graining of the temporal axis, and
can therefore help describing cognitive processes even when there
is no behaviorally observable event. Thus, it is only logical that
experiments should strive to maximize the resolution of the
instrument chosen to record brain activity.
Temporal resolution is typically sought for so as to optimize
the chances of detecting, and accurately localizing, the onset of
events, often lacking a corresponding behaviorally observable
one. These landmarks may for instance identify the boundaries
between microstates, i.e., quasi-stationary segments of duration
l ≤ 150ms (Koenig et al., 2002) where the activity field remains
stable, punctuated by abrupt changes to new configurations
(Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2004; Kaplan et al., 2005). These
stable segments were proposed to be “atoms of thought” (Koukou
and Lehmann, 1987), supposedly corresponding to different
information processing steps.
How well these transitions can be detected does not solely
hinge on the instrument used to record brain activity. The instru-
ment’s sampling rate sets the lower bound to detectable scales,
via the corresponding Nyquist frequency, i.e., half the sam-
pling frequency of a discrete signal processing system. Ultimately,
though, the effective temporal resolution of a given experiment
is determined by the analyses carried out on the data and, more
specifically, by the size of the smallest temporal fluctuations that
these analyses allow resolving. So, for instance, standard trial-
averaging in time-locked evoked potential extraction does not
possess millisecond precision, even for a sampling rate of that
order, and typically not even that corresponding to frequencies
lower than the Nyquist frequency.
The extent to which the boundaries of quasi-stationary seg-
ments per se can identify a given cognitive process depends on the
properties of the phenomenon to be studied.
Event-related perceptual processes are typicallymodeled as fast
phenomena of known characteristic duration L ∼ 1 s with fluctu-
ations in duration negligible with respect to the mean character-
istic duration (δL/〈L〉  1). For these processes, quasi-stationary
segments can be used to partition a given epoch into discrete tem-
poral units, with identifiable temporal landmarks (Kaplan et al.,
2005). One can then hope to map the identified landmarks onto
identifiable cognitive steps, whose temporal location averaging
across repetitions of the same task would then help refining.
A clear partitioning into cognitive steps is more complex for
slow processes, such as some forms of conceptual learning, and
essentially stationary phenomena, such as memory processes,
which often come in episodes with durations various orders of
magnitude larger than perceptual processes. A static or compar-
ative statics approach is typically used (e.g., Karni et al., 1995),
wherein statical measures of brain activity at different learning
steps are compared, ultimately drastically flattening the inherently
dynamical aspect of cognition.
Partitioning into cognitive steps processes such as reasoning
and thinking is even more difficult, when equipped solely with
temporal resolution. Not only do these processes lack a trivial
temporal duration, but they also come in long episodes (L ∼
minutes or more), where a large number of cognitive processes
interact in a wide range of temporal scales, with unconstrained
inner structure and no behavioral correlates most of the time.
The associated brain activity is not event-related in the classi-
cal sense of the term, as its duration and profile are independent
of the physical and statistical characteristics of the stimulus elic-
iting a given reasoning episode. These processes are also highly
non-stationary, rendering the meaning of static descriptions (viz.
time averages over long time windows, spanning entire reasoning
episodes) problematic.
Thus, for this sort of activity, both the temporal scales of
episodes and a partition into cognitive steps become highly
non-trivial. The former needs to be evaluated for the underly-
ing physical phenomenon to be properly described, while the
meaning of each particular quasi-stationary segment in isolation
becomes unclear. As a consequence, extracting meaningful infor-
mation from a set of different trials of these processes becomes
arduous.
In summary, we illustrated the concept of temporal resolution,
and showed that, rather than by the neuroimaging technique’s
sampling rate, the effective resolution of a given experiment
is ultimately determined by the method used to analyse the
data. Temporal resolution is often thought to be necessary and
sufficient to identify cognitively relevant quasi-stationary seg-
ments of brain activity. This statement holds to a high degree of
Frontiers in Physiology | Fractal Physiology April 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 86 | 2
Papo Time scales in cognitive neuroscience
approximation for fast processes with a typical overall duration,
but not for a vast class of cognitive phenomena lacking a typical
temporal duration. For this latter class, additional quantifiers of
temporal scales need be taken into account.
CHARACTERISTIC TIME(S)
The brain is a non-equilibrium system, exhibiting fluctuations in
a wide range of temporal (and spatial) scales, most of which are
not observable from behavior alone. Cognition should inherit,
though possibly in rather complex ways, a subset at least of the
scales of brain activity, which become distinctive properties of
cognitive processes.
For short duration perceptual processes, the brain can bemod-
eled as an excitable medium, and perception itself is understood
as a process whereby the brain relaxes to equilibrium, follow-
ing exposure to discrete exogenous perturbations or stimuli. For
perturbations smaller than a characteristic threshold, a stable sta-
tionary solution exists, where the brain is assumed to be quiet
on average. Perturbations above the threshold make a dynami-
cal cycle observable, after which the system goes back to its initial
resting state, with a characteristic relaxation time of the order of
the average duration (τrelax ≈ 〈L〉).
On much longer time scales, cognitive processes such as
learning may sometimes still be conceptualized as relaxational
processes, but the cycle generally takes a non-trivial form. On
the other hand, processes such as long-term memory, reason-
ing and thinking, are respectively stationary and non-stationary
non-relaxational processes, and the corresponding neural activ-
ity is dominated not by a forcing stimulus, but by endogenous
fluctuations (Buice and Cowan, 2009).
These processes have no typical duration L, and are generally
temporally extended, i.e., their duration is much larger than the
size of a typical fluctuation (L  τfluct). This supposes examining
the time scales between the temporal resolution and the largest
observable one.
A straightforward way to show how the time scales of cognitive
tasks arise is to model the associated brain activity as a dissipa-
tive dynamic process X(t), describing the motion of a diffusing
macroscopic particle in a complex configuration space. The par-
ticle is subject to a viscous friction, changing with a time scale τm,
and to an additive random force η(t) drive having a characteristic
time τη (Hsu and Hsu, 2009). The relationship between τm and
τη determines how microscopic fluctuations renormalize to give
rise to observable macroscopic dynamical and statistical prop-
erties, and ultimately defines temporal scales of the underlying
phenomenon.
Cognitive neuroscience studies typically implicitly adopt a
Markovian approximation, where the noise has fast vanishing
Gaussian δ-correlated fluctuations, and τη  τm. The corre-
sponding process hops without memory from a given config-
uration to some other, and in the long time limit (t  τm),
the temporal autocorrelation of macroscopic velocity fluctuations
Cii(τ) = 〈vi(x(τ))vi(x(0))〉 (where 〈·〉 designates an average over
all times τ) decays as ∼ exp(−t/τm).
τm is unique, and is called characteristic time. The Central
limit theorem (CLT) ensures that, in the long time limit, the
probability density function of the particle’s velocity converges
to a Gaussian; the mean-square distance (MSD) travelled by the
particle increases linearly in time:
〈|x(t) − x(0)|2〉 ∼ t2ν with ν = 1
2
(1)
a characteristic of normal diffusion.
Note that the relationship between
MSD and autocorrelation function is given by:
〈|x(t) − x(0)|2〉 =
∫ t
0
∫ t
0
〈
υi(xt1)υi(xt2)
〉
dt1dt2
≈ 2t
∫ t
0
Cii(τ)dτ (2)
The characteristic time τm, the corresponding correlation time
τC , i.e., the integral of the autocorrelation function over its sup-
port, and the correlation length, i.e., the value ξ such that C(t =
ξ) = 0, (with τC =
∫ ξ
0 C(t)dt ≤ Cmaxξ), endow a given process
with a temporal scale, independently of its having a characteristic
duration, and naturally segment it into separable parts, although
in a statistical way.
These scales can be seen as a measure of how fast the system
looses memory of its own past. If the system forgets its own past
infinitely fast, this time window is infinitely short, and a moment
is a point with no dimension. If the system has memory, at each
given time, there is an active time window spanning its memory
length. This active window can be seen as an estimate of what the
system considers as a moment.
Furthermore, under the Markovian approximation, sponta-
neous activity is an unstructured attractor state, and perturba-
tions (e.g., sensory stimuli) produce a temporally local effect, so
that what is observed is a temporally disordered (L  ξ) perfectly
elastic fast relaxation process.
In general, the Markovian approximation does not hold when
long time scales of brain activity are considered. The friction
force becomes retarded or frequency-dependent, and the statis-
tics of the driving noise is neither Gaussian (Freyer et al., 2009)
nor δ-correlated. The dynamics incorporates extended memory
and temporal non-locality. Ordinary exponential relaxation is
replaced by complex, viz. Mittag-Leffler (Bianco et al., 2007a)
scaling, with stretched exponential relaxation ∼ exp [−(t/τ)α] at
microscopic scales (t < τ), and asymptotical convergence to an
inverse power law ∼ [−(t/τ)α] for t  τ, 0 < α < 1 (Novikov
et al., 1997; Linkenkaer-Hansen et al., 2001; Gong et al., 2002;
Freeman et al., 2003; Stam and de Bruin, 2004; Buiatti et al., 2007;
van de Ville et al., 2010; Freyer et al., 2012). For α ≤ 1, the correla-
tion time τC and the corresponding correlation length ξ diverge.
Note that correlation time τC and characteristic time τm, which
coincide for exponential functional forms of the autocorrelation
function, do not coincide for power-law ones. The CLT is vio-
lated and scale separation is lost, so that microscopic stochasticity
becomes detectable at macroscopic scales (Grigolini et al., 1999).
Activity undergoes anomalous diffusion with the MSD travelled
by the particle no longer a linear function of time:
〈|x(t) − x(0)|2〉 ∼ t2ν with ν 	= 1
2
(3)
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The logarithmic slope of the time-dependent MSD provides an
indication of the type of motion: subdiffusion and superdiffusion
correspond to 0 ≤ ν < 12 , and 12 ≤ ν < 1 respectively.
One fundamental implication for the temporal scales of cogni-
tion is that activity lacks a characteristic scale, and is described by
some relationship defined on a set {τi}, rather than by τi-s them-
selves. R can take the form of a scaling exponent ν relating some
measure of brain activity to its frequency. Exact self-similarity
implies that fluctuations at a given scale are similar to fluctua-
tions at all other scales, so that the probability distribution that
the particle has travelled a distance x at time t is given by:
P(x, t) = t−νF (x/tν) (4)
where the scaling exponent ν is unique for all scales, and F is a
scaling function. When dealing with real data, self-similarity is not
exact but has a statistical sense, and lower and upper cut-offs nec-
essarily appear. Without the scaling range, the scaling properties
may be distinctly different from those of Equations 3 and 4 (Latka
et al., 2004; Buiatti et al., 2007).
When they exist, the moments of self-similar processes behave
as power laws with respect to time (Abry, 2003), and the time
dependence of the qth moment of the displacement is defined by:
〈|x(t) − x(0)|q〉 ∼ tqν∀q > 0 (5)
Small and large values of q sample the central part and the tails of
the distribution, corresponding to small and exceptionally large
displacements respectively. In real data, the scaling exponent need
not be unique for all moments of the distribution, and entire
spectrum of scaling exponents may exist. For instance, in the pres-
ence of multiplicative interactions and interdependencies among
temporal scales (Ihlen and Vereijken, 2010), the moments q of the
travelled distance may take the form:
〈|x(t) − x(0)|q〉 ∼ tqν(q)ν(q) 	= const (6)
and the underlying diffusion process is weakly self-similar
(Ferrari et al., 2001) or strongly anomalous (Castiglione et al.,
1999). The motion representing the size of neural events, exhibits
steps of all sizes, from local confined motion to extremely long
jumps. Furthermore, the scaling need not be of a power-law form
(Chainais et al., 2005). The probability density P (x, t) is no longer
specified by a unique scaling exponent but by a spectrum of scal-
ing exponents. One way to represent the distribution Pλ(x, t) at
any given scale λ within the scaling range is as the convolution
Pλ(x, t) = G(q,R) ⊗ P(x, t) (7)
of the distribution P(x, t) at the highest scale and G(q,R),
the probability distribution of the relation across temporal scales
(Castaing et al., 1990). More generally, can be seen as a random
process in time scale τ relating, e.g., the shape of the velocity incre-
ment distribution of the dynamic process X(t) at one time-scale
to that at other time-scales (Friedrich et al., 2000; Bacry et al.,
2001), or the behavior through scales of the relationship between
different models in a renormalization group approach (Longo
et al., 2012). For instance, methods have been developed to derive
an explicit equation for the changes in the variable X(t) over a
series of nested time-scales of decreasing durations from the data
(Friedrich et al., 2011).
The spatially-extended nature of the brain gives rise to addi-
tional time scales. Spatial extension introduces not only dynami-
cal heterogeneity, i.e., a spatial distribution of time scales, but also
time scales emerging from cooperative or competitive phenom-
ena, which typically display regimes and unfold at scales different
from those of spatially local components (Bianco et al., 2007b;
Allegrini et al., 2011). Space-induced time scales can also stem
from temporal non-localities induced by transmission delays, and
from transients, whose duration typically scales with the size of
the system (Tél and Lai, 2008).
The presence of correlated driving noise and cross-scale
relationships produces temporally ordered structures (L ∼ ξ),
and dilates a moment, from the essentially pointwise extension
induced by δ-correlated noise to a temporally non-local one, so
that in general the meaning of activity at a given time point is not
easily divorced from activity occurring within the scaling range.
The size of a moment need not be stationary in time. In fact,
the breakdown of exact self-similarity for non-constant values of
q in Equation 6 implies that there no longer is a unique dilation
factor, but a collection of factors with a given distribution. Insofar
as temporal scale invariance is a continuous symmetry linking a
translation in time to a translation in space, brain activity can
be seen as stemming from a system moving at constant velocity,
given by the scaling exponent (Sornette, 2004). The break-down
of scale invariance (Ciuciu et al., 2011, 2012; Zilber et al., 2012) is
tantamount to velocity changes.
One possible way to represent this is to assume that brain
dynamics makes steps between given locations of its phase space,
in which it dwells for a certain time, and that times between two
consecutive steps are characterized by a given waiting-time distri-
bution (WTD). The steps mark a sort of internal operational time,
which can grow sub- or superlinearly with the physical time. While
in the absence of multiplicative interactions, the function G of
Equation 7 collapses into a single point and operational and phys-
ical time coincide,multiplicative interactions across scales bias the
distribution of waiting times between successive steps. As a result,
local probability densities are time-dependent and intermittent,
with laminar periods interrupted by bursts of large and irregular
activity of different sizes (Gong et al., 2007; Freyer et al., 2012).
Intermittency allows reducing brain phenomena evolving in
continuous time to event-based point processes and therefore
defining the boundaries of individual microstates in a temporally
local way. Point processes generate events distinct from back-
ground activity, their value being non-zero only when an “event”
occurs, and are thus particularly suitable to describe and model
system dynamics characterized by the occurrence of events. The
temporal scales of cognitive processes are expressed in terms of
the scaling properties of the density distribution function f (l) of
microstate durations l (Allegrini et al., 2010). In fine, if task-
related brain activity is considered as a particle evolving in a
complex metastable state, the global temporal dimension is of
the order of the Kramers escape time from or mean first passage
times in a potential, i.e., the average time elapsed until a stochastic
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process starting at a given point leaves a prescribed domain for the
first time, and typically much longer than the dynamic time scales
characterizing states of local stability (Hänggi et al., 1990).
While complex scaling appears as a generic property of sponta-
neous brain activity, the relevance of the temporal scales and their
structure to cognition can be appreciated from two interrelated
perspectives.
On the one hand, the stimulus-related dynamic range of a
neural network can be related to its spontaneous activity (Shew
et al., 2009). This is a consequence of the fluctuation-dissipation
theorem (FDT), which establishes a general relationship between
the (equilibrium) internal autocorrelation C(t) of fluctuations of
some observable of the system in the absence of the disturbance
and the (non-equilibrium) response R(t) of a system to small
external perturbations (Kubo, 1966). Suitably modified versions
of the FDT also hold for out-of-equilibrium systems (Cugliandolo
et al., 1997; Crisanti and Ritort, 2003; Pottier and Mauger, 2004;
Allegrini et al., 2007; Aquino et al., 2007).
On the other hand, the FDT allows conceptualizing cogni-
tive processes as fields acting upon brain activity (Papo, 2013),
whose response and associated time scales can be studied using
response theory (Kubo, 1966). This conceptualization is particu-
larly intuitive for perceptual stimulus-dependent brain activity.
For a generic stimulus-independent process, the effect of cog-
nition can be identified with the noise driving the endogenous
dynamics, and asymptotic regimes depend on the ratio between
correlation time and intensity of the driving noise, as well as on
its statistics (Hänggi and Jung, 1995).
The response to a perturbation depends on the relative time
scale of the perturbation and the characteristic times of the
system’s dynamics. Suppose, for instance, that the brain is a har-
monic oscillator of bare frequency ω0, and that a given stimulus
an applied perturbation asin(ωt). Then, additive perturbations
would average out over a vanishingly small time interval for ω 
ω0, would follow the perturbation in a frequency-specific way for
ω  ω0, and would non-generically show resonance forω ≈ ω0.
However, both ecologic stimuli and brain activity are generally
more complex than this simple picture. Accumulating evidence
shows that the brain generically responds to changing external
fields with a series of avalanches spanning a broad range of scales
(Fairhall et al., 2001; Gilboa et al., 2005; Drew and Abbott, 2006;
Lundstrom et al., 2008). Fluctuations in ongoing brain activity
display weak ergodicity breaking (Bianco et al., 2007a; West et al.,
2008), a condition wherein the state space is still entirely accessi-
ble to the system, but where the Carlson depth τCd, i.e., the time
that the system requires to visit the whole state space, may be
very long, as the system dwells for very long times in some of its
accessible microstates.
Cognition may affect cross-scale relations R in a number of
different ways: bymodulating temporal correlations (Linkenkaer-
Hansen et al., 2004; Buice and Cowan, 2009), thereby inducing
phase transitions in mean first-passage time regimes (Carretero-
Campos et al., 2012); by inducing transitions between non-scaling
and scaling regimes or between different asymptotic scaling
regimes (Linkenkaer-Hansen et al., 2004; Buiatti et al., 2007;
He et al., 2010; Ciuciu et al., 2011, 2012; Zilber et al., 2012),
which reflect the cooperative nature of brain activity (Bianco
et al., 2007b), and may correspond to dynamical transitions in
the system’s behavior (Burov and Barkai, 2008); by modulating
the degree of non-ergodicity, corresponding to different ways of
visiting the state space, a conjecture that has not yet received
empirical support. External perturbations may particularly influ-
ence the scale at which the WTD is expected to show scaling,
while endogenous activity likely affects the scaling properties of
the events’ waiting time distribution (Aquino et al., 2011). More
generally, cognitive function should acquire the temporal scales
of the order parameter used to describe it.
All these transitions should ultimately result in operational
time and corresponding time scale modulations. For example,
plausible testable hypotheses are that cognition maymodulate the
Markov time τM , i.e., the minimum length interval over which
the data can be considered as a Markov process, even when the
process itself is not Markovian, or the time scale of the transi-
tion from microscopic to macroscopic dynamics (Aquino et al.,
2007), or the time scales at which fluctuations start converging to
a Gaussian distribution (Mantegna and Stanley, 1994; Manshour
et al., 2009).
In summary, the perceptual neuroscientist deals with an
excitable medium, and what is typically studied is a fast lin-
ear response to stimulations. It can be treated as an essen-
tially exponential world, with very short memory and a unique
characteristic time scale, without losing too much information.
The reasoning neuroscientist, on the other hand, faces long
time scales of ongoing brain activity, where properties such as
non-Gaussianity, non-ergodicity, scale-freeness and long-term
memory play a prominent role which cannot be overlooked. A
fundamental physical theorem, the FDT, explains why these rest-
ing brain properties can be inherited by activity associated with
the execution of cognitive task. As a consequence, not only are
the time scales of task-related brain activity no longer unique but
they also possess complex relationships among them. The time
scales and their relationships can be quantified from real data in
terms of scaling exponents (e.g., of autocorrelation or waiting time
distribution functions), scaling functions and the typical shape
of fluctuations, or even of explicit evolution equations for the
position or velocity and for the probability distribution of fluc-
tuations (Fokker–Planck equation). Ways in which time scales of
task-independent brain activity can be modulated by task-related
brain activity have been suggested.
OBSERVATION TIME
Cognitive neuroscientists observe phenomena through experi-
ments in which subjects typically carry out a given task a large
number of times, which are meant to adequately sample (a mean-
ingful portion of) the phase space of task-related brain activity.
Fatigue and other factors limit the typical observation time within
a given experimental session to the order of tens of minutes,
while experiments (e.g., those assessing sleep-related learning)
may consist of more than one session, each of which comprising
a given number of trials.
Proper observation of a given process requires that the obser-
vation time τObs (in this case the entire experiment) be much
larger than any scale in the system. Thus, τObs should be pro-
foundly different for processes with dissimilar time scales. A
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measure of observability is given by the Deborah number De :=
τrel/τObs, i.e., the ratio between the characteristic time of the vari-
able used to describe brain activity, and the length of the time
series made available by an experiment (Reiner, 1964). The sys-
tem is ergodic for small values of De but weakly non-ergodic for
De → ∞ (Rebenshtok and Barkai, 2007).
Various factors at different temporal scales, both within and
across trials, may complicate the observability of cognitive phe-
nomena.
The observation time should ideally be much larger than the
time needed to visit the phase space of task-related brain activ-
ity (τObs  τCd). Ensuring sufficient phase space sampling may
represent an impervious task when dealing with complex cogni-
tive processes. For instance, if we take the example of a generic
open-ended reasoning task, it is difficult to decide whether a
reasoning episode, or indeed even an ensemble of episodes, suf-
ficiently sample the repertoire available to a subject. The way
the space is sampled by separate trials of an experiment may
present some complexity even for fast relaxational processes,
where τCd is approximated by the Poincaré recurrence time τP.
For instance, observed inter-trial fluctuations can be thought of
as a sign of the system’s exploring its dynamic repertoire (Ghosh
et al., 2007; Deco et al., 2011). Contrary to the case of com-
plex forms of reasoning, for which trials can typically be very
long, most perceptual tasks are of relative short average dura-
tion, and this allows increasing the number of experimental
trials.
Another important factor to take into account is stationarity,
i.e., invariance under time shift of the joint probability distribu-
tion, or at least of some moments of the variables quantified in a
given experiment.
In behavioral studies (e.g., Ihlen and Vereijken, 2010), sin-
gle trials are often mapped into a scalar, e.g., a response time,
and the process that is considered is given by the sequence of
these scalars in the experiment. The underlying cross-scale pro-
cess is generally considered stationary over the entire experiment
encompassing a large number of trials, independently of whether
the local probabilities show or not time-dependence.
In cognitive neuroscience, each trial is mapped onto brain
activity, and this forces into dealing with within-trial as well as
inter-trial (and occasionally inter-session) stationarity. Complex
cognitive processes such as reasoning present an inherent
dilemma between two opposing needs: to ensure that the tortu-
ous phase space be explored on the one hand, and that the signal
be stationary on the other. The former may require extremely
long trials. While, in principle, for the inverse power law regime
to be observable, trial length needs to be much longer than the
time scale of stretched exponential relaxation (Grigolini, 2008),
the asymptotic regimemay nonetheless be inferred through finite-
size scaling analysis (Fisher and Barber, 1972). This method takes
into account the finite size of experimental data by conveniently
rescaling the correlation length ξ by the system’s linear size L and
observing how measured quantities vary for different values of L.
The values for the critical exponents are then recovered by tak-
ing the infinite limit L → ∞. On the other hand, in the long
time regime, brain activity associated with the execution of com-
plex cognitive tasks is characterized by the presence of long-term
memory, weak ergodicity breaking and aging, i.e., temporal cor-
relations and WTDs become dependent on the observation time
(West et al., 2008). As a result, De may diverge and τCd  〈L〉.
While stationarity may be assured stricto sensu only for time
scales that are much shorter than the typical duration of, e.g.,
a reasoning episode, a quasi-stationary regime for the suscep-
tibility of the system can be identified over time scales τμ 
τQStat  τrel for a given waiting timemuch larger than the slowest
frequency in the data (t  ω−1) (Crisanti and Ritort, 2003).
A standard assumption in cognitive neuroscience is that sep-
arate trials of a given experiment are identically distributed,
independent samples, each accounting for the same part of an
underlying attractor. The CLT ensures that trial averaged quanti-
ties approach a Gaussian distribution. For instance, event-related
brain potential studies assume that an observed response xj(t)
can be decomposed into a stereotyped evoked response ej occur-
ring with a constant delay after a given stimulus, and additive
Gaussian noise ξj. Averaging then improves the signal-to-noise
ratio by a factor
√
N , where the number of responses N typically
equals 20–300, and
〈
xj(t)
〉 → ej(t) for N → ∞. However, under
conditions that are explained below, trials may be neither identi-
cally distributed, nor independent in practice, so that adding trials
may not increase the signal-to-noise ratio as the square root of the
number of trials.
For trials to represent a basic periodicity, not only should
{τi,R} be equal for all trials, in a statistical sense, but it is also
necessary that τCd ≤ 〈L〉. If, on the contrary, τCd > 〈L〉, each
trial corresponds to different parts of a vast attractor with trial-
specific subparts (rather than sampling the same part of the state
space). Trial repetition could then improve phase space explo-
ration rather than the signal-to-noise ratio. This may for instance
be the case of different reasoning trials of a given experiment, as
there is typically more than one way to carry out a given task, and
the repertoire of corresponding brain activity may be vast.
Trial independence requires that the inter-trial interval be
ITI  τrelax. For example, in perceptual tasks, ensuring inter-trial
independence requires that the brain response to a given stimulus
vanishes before the following is presented. This condition may be
harder to fulfil than is often assumed in standard event-related
potential studies, given that the brain response to stimuli does
not vanish exponentially fast, but rather in a history-dependent
broad-band fashion (Gilboa et al., 2005; Drew and Abbott, 2006;
Lundstrom et al., 2008).
The presence of learning means that the dynamic repertoire of
brain activity may change during the course of the experiment. In
other words, the phase space landscape itself may evolve, as a con-
sequence of learning. Landscape fluctuations are usually thought
to be much slower than those of the system; however, in many
contexts, changes may occur on time scales τL ≤ τObs so that
the landscape dynamics cannot be neglected. For τL ≈ 〈L〉, the
statistics of within-trial landscape dynamics can be considered as
quasi-stationary. When, instead, the landscape shows significant
fluctuations at the single trial level (τL ≤ 〈L〉), the phase space
itself may not be well-defined.
Within-trial statistics, landscape dynamics, path dependence,
and essential transience all affect the way trials of a given experi-
ment can be treated in an aggregate way.
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In the presence of scale-free distributions, long-range correla-
tions and inter-trial path-dependence, trials may show weak or
no self-averaging, i.e., letting the sample become larger does not
improve statistics, as dispersion may remain even when the num-
ber of trials goes to infinity (Aharony and Harris, 1996). This in
turn warns that care should be taken when averaging across trials,
and indicates that, at least up to certain scales, the inter-trial tem-
poral scales of a given experiment might better be accounted for
in alternative, conceptually different ways, e.g., by characterizing
the scaling properties, data collapse and universality of probability
distributions (Bramwell et al., 1998; Friedman et al., 2012).
Furthermore, fixed landscape and disorder-averaged prop-
erties, respectively corresponding to a distribution of walkers
initially concentrated or spread out over the sample (Bouchaud
and Georges, 1990) should be treated differently when calculating
experiment-wide statistics.
Finally, while relaxation can be slow enough as to de facto rule
out the existence of an underlying attractor dynamics, different
transients can be used to reveal parts of the vector field associated
with the cognitive space; estimates of conditional probabilities
and of the corresponding stochastic dynamical systems can be
derived frommultiple, small data sets rather than from of a single
long one (van Mourik et al., 2006).
In summary, a number of factors may affect observability of
cognitive phenomena: sheer complexity of the phase space of
task-related brain activity, long-term memory, aging and weak
ergodicity breaking of single trial trajectories, path dependence,
phase space evolution, and essential transience. These factors
influence the way experiments ought to be designed to ensure that
the phenomena under study are appropriately observed, the sta-
tus of single trials of a given experiment, and the corresponding
analyses used to aggregate them. Experiments (viz. through their
overall length, their design into trials), and analyses (e.g., through
thresholds and windowing procedures) both introduce spurious
scales of which experimenters should be aware.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
A proper characterization of temporal scales provides on the one
hand principled guidance for basic experimental steps and, on the
other hand, a means to correctly identify the neural correlates of
important cognitive phenomena.
Methods of data analysis ranging from the level of inter-
trial aggregation procedures down to fundamental single-trial
level ones crucially depend on the knowledge of the temporal
scales of the phenomenon at hand. Experimental designs should
correspondingly hinge on a general understanding of the phe-
nomenon’s temporal scales. For example, at the inter-trial level,
when studying generic open-ended forms of reasoning, few long
trials may ensure better exploration of the state space than mul-
tiple time-constrained ones. Short reasoning episodes may have
a drastically simpler neural phase space than a single longer one.
On the other hand, the longer the considered reasoning episode,
the more probable that it accurately visits the complex phase
space of task-related brain activity, and the better its time average
approximates an ensemble average.
At the single-trial level, measures of brain activity (e.g.,
local amplitudes, or correlations or synchronization between two
recording sites) are often time-averaged within windows in which
they are stationary.While the size of time windows is often chosen
once and for all for entire data sets, searching for true microstates,
which can be thought of as stationary segments, implies a data-
driven segmentation (van de Ville et al., 2010). In the presence of
long-range temporal correlations, however, defining the bound-
aries of stationary segments is an inherently arduous task, and
even more so when evaluating global microstates of whole-brain
activity. On the other hand, ensuring stationarity by considering
short time-windows may come at the price of sacrificing tem-
poral scales, as typical procedures de facto constitute high-pass
filters on the data, and would thus lead to missing key aspects
of the dynamics. As a consequence, an appropriate strategy may
require working with quantities evaluated over extremely short
time-windows (e.g., Bianco et al., 2007a).
A similar conclusion holds for the choice of recording param-
eters, viz. sampling rates. For instance, surprising though it may
read, temporal resolution is in general not sought to increase
the ability to understand the complex relationship between pro-
cesses unfolding at different temporal scales. Indeed, it is fair to
say that the very concept of temporal scale is essentially alien to
standard cognitive neuroscience. A telltale of this is that, curi-
ously, the need for temporal precision is often thought to be
inversely proportional to the typical temporal duration of the
cognitive process to be investigated, rather than to its complex-
ity. In other words, temporal precision is often thought to be
needed more when studying short (e.g., perceptual) than long
(e.g., in reasoning) processes. The idea is that temporal precision
is essentially required to capture fast, fleeting processes, which
would otherwise go unnoticed. It is however important to see
that, in the case of a complex process such as reasoning, the
reconstruction of the tortuous phase space trajectory improves
with the amount of available (non-spuriously correlated) time
points.
The explicit handling of the temporal dimension of cognition
allows framing the neural correlates of given cognitive processes
in terms of temporal scales, and their set of relationships. In
fact, describing cognitive function may sometimes essentially boil
down to specifying {τi,R}, which may in turn constitute a neces-
sary condition for the statistical treatment of experimental data. A
particularly clear illustration is represented by complex phenom-
ena such as conceptual learning or reasoning and thinking, which,
as we have seen, lack both an average temporal duration and
inner segmentation. Deriving generic characteristics of such pro-
cesses in spite of their inherent variability, or evaluating whether
a given observation time is sufficient cannot be done without
characterizing time scales and describing task-modulated changes
in the relationship among processes unfolding at different time
scales.
Overall, some general experimental indications for cognitive
scientists can be derived. Accounting for the temporal scales of
complex cognitive processes may involve changes in the ways
experiments are designed, data analysed and brain recording
instruments and the relative parameters are chosen. Which of
these aspects needs to be changed with respect to standard proce-
dures depends on the type of cognitive process under study.While
studying fast perceptual processes may only involve changes in
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data analysis methods, studying phenomena such as thinking or
reasoningmay require a more global change of all of these aspects.
Indeed, these fundamental changes are necessary to tackle the
most challenging aspects of these extremely complex cognitive
processes.
Specifically, we highlight four main experimental implications.
(1) With phenomena lacking a clear characteristic duration, e.g.,
open-ended forms of reasoning, it may be interesting to build
experiments with few long trials with rich dynamical repertoire.
(2) Different trials of a given experiment (be they short-lived
perceptual or long duration reasoning tasks) should not automat-
ically be treated as independent samples of the same part of an
underlying attractor, and may not self-average as their number
is increased. This may bear important consequences both on the
type of metric that can be used to quantify brain activity and on
the statistical tests that may highlight differences between exper-
imental conditions. (3) At shorter time scales, there is a mutual
influence between the time scales of the process and the choice of
the window size in which relevant quantities (the choice of which
is not the goal of the present article, and depend of the inves-
tigator’s goals) are calculated. Decisions must then be made as
to the size of these windows. (4) While an appropriate temporal
sampling rate is necessary to detect abrupt short-lived transi-
tions, irrespective of the considered cognitive phenomenon under
study, it is also necessary to reconstruct the underlying dynam-
ics, contrary to the common stance whereby processes such as
reasoning or thinking may just need a poor time-resolution
recording device.
Finally, at a more conceptual level, the time scales of a given
phenomenon and, in particular, the relationship R among them
contain information on the mechanisms through which cognitive
processes interact to give rise to cognitive performance (Holden
et al., 2009). The long time limit loss of time-scale separation
provides a possible mechanism through which changes at faster
time scales (e.g., fast perceptual and attentional processes) may
be embedded into activity (e.g., memory processes) unfolding
at times scales several orders of magnitude larger (Fujimoto and
Kaneko, 2003). The presence of scaling in a broad range of time
scales suggests that observable behavior is but the uppermost
level of a scale-invariant phenomenon and may be understood
as a macroscopic coarse-grained aspect of ongoing brain activ-
ity (Fingelkurts et al., 2010), resulting from the renormalization
of its fluctuations, and that cognitive function may not always
be decomposable into less complex component processes. Time
can also be regarded as a variable revealing the constructive
rules underlying the spatial structure of task-related brain activ-
ity at various scales (Pérez-Mercader, 2004; Itzkovitz et al., 2005;
Delvenne et al., 2010).
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